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that a distinction needs to be made between children and combatants,
as children cannot be legitimate objects of military attack.
International Human Rights law tells us of other rights of children:
their rights to safety, bodily integrity, liberty, and not to be charged
with crimes they lack the mens rea to commit. It is a crime under
both Humanitarian and Human Rights Law for children under fifteen
to be recruited as soldiers. This is reflected by Rules 136 and 137 of
Customary International Humanitarian law and by the Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict.1 In contrast, a soldier
under Humanitarian Law is a combatant, a person who can lawfully
both kill and be killed and who is a legitimate military target.2 How
can a child be both a protected person and a combatant? Does one
supersede the other?

I. INTRODUCTION
A coalition of international states—including the United States
(U.S.), Canada, France, the United Kingdom (U.K.) and Australia—
is currently engaged in military operations against the Islamic State
in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Material distributed by ISIS, and reports
from the field, show that ISIS employs child combatants as it does
adult combatants, and on a large scale, with an estimated 1500
persons under eighteen years old serving as of late 2016. This raises
1. See, e.g., Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on
the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict preamble, art. 1, May 25, 2000,
2173 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights
of the Child] (ensuring that State Parties “shall take all feasible measures to ensure
that members of their armed forces who have not attained the age of 18 years do
not take a direct part in hostilities”); JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE
DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW VOLUME I:
RULES 479-88 (Int’l Committee of the Red Cross 2005).
2. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)
art. 43(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 23 [hereinafter Protocol I]; Convention
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 3, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat.
2277, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Hague IV]; Convention Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land art. 3, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403
[hereinafter Hague II]; HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 1, at 11
(explaining that “all members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict are
combatants, except medical and religious personnel”).
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two significant legal questions, under three areas of law—
International Humanitarian Law (IHL), also known as the laws of
war; International Human Rights Law (IHRL), embodied in human
rights treaties; and, International Criminal Law (ICL), the
enforceability mechanism of IHL, customary law, and specific
international criminal law instruments.
The first question raised is this: what is the status of ISIS’ more
than 1500 child soldiers, and how should coalition forces legally
regard them? IHRL reinforces a child’s right to life, and that all
children should be protected in times of conflict. IHL provides that,
whilst it is illegal to enlist child soldiers, once they are part of the
military they may be lawfully attacked as combatants where they
wear the uniform of combatants and can be considered actively
engaged in hostilities. ICL, however, has held that child soldiers
only lose protections afforded to children and civilians under IHL
when they are actively engaged in hostilities.
The second question is one of speculative post-conflict transitional
justice. ISIS has published propaganda footage of its child soldiers
committing executions and bombings. Post-conflict, what will be the
culpability of ISIS’ former child soldiers under international law?
IHRL is unclear on the issue. Some provisions of IHRL deal with
issues of the minimum age of criminal responsibility. IHL protects
the conditions alleged child criminals may be detained in, and
prohibits the death penalty, indicating that IHL is consistent with a
former child soldier being charged for crimes committed whilst a
minor. In ICL, however, there has never been a prosecution of any
person for crimes committed while a child. The Special Court for
Sierra Leone had the jurisdiction to make such prosecutions, yet
chose not to do so, instead criminalizing the act of recruiting child
soldiers. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
expresses that it only has jurisdiction over crimes committed by
persons who were eighteen or over at the time of the crime.

II. RECRUITING CHILD SOLDIERS AS
PROHIBITED UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Child soldiers are not a new phenomenon and depictions of child
combatants are frequent in both history and literature. The Old
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Testament’s Book of Samuel tells the story of David, the youngest
son of Jesse the Bethlehemite, who, while still a “youth”3 fought
against the Philistine warrior Goliath, and won.4 As a child
combatant, David self-described himself as indestructible, as if he
believed he was a deity, demonstrating a distinct lack of awareness
regarding the risks of contesting an adult soldier experienced in
hand-to-hand combat, as is evidenced by David proclaiming to his
adversary: “Thou comest to me with a sword, and with a spear, and
with a shield: but I come to thee in the name of the Lord of hosts, the
God of the armies of Israel.”5 In 1429, during the Hundred Years
War, Jeanne d’Arc was only seventeen years old when she led
French soldiers against the British occupation of France.6 The most
recent analysis of child soldier engagement globally was undertaken
in 2008 by the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. The
report found evidence of military recruitment of children and the use
of child soldiers in hostilities in eighty-six states and territories
worldwide.7
The Cape Town Principles of 1977 provide an early, broad and
widely accepted definition of a child soldier as:
[A]ny person under eighteen years of age who is part of any kind of
regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity . . . other
than family members. The definition includes girls recruited for sexual
purposes and forced marriage. It does not, therefore, only refer to a child
who is carrying or has carried arms.8

It is well established under international law that recruiting child
soldiers is prohibited, and there has been a strong global movement
3.
4.
5.
6.

1 Samuel 17:33 (King James).
Id. at 17:4, 51.
Id. at 17:45.
See James A. Freeman, Joan of Arc: Soldier, Saint, Symbol – of What?, 41
J. POPULAR CULTURE 601, 601-02 (2008) (explaining that Joan of Arc was also
only nineteen years old when she was burnt at the stake, and, in 1920, almost 500
years later, she was canonized).
7. COALITION TO STOP CHILD SOLDIERS, CHILD SOLDIERS: GLOBAL REPORT
2008 3 (2008).
8. See UNICEF, Cape Town Principles and Best Practices on the Prevention
of Recruitment of Children into the Armed Forces and on Demobilization and
Social Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Africa (1999) (resulting from a
symposium held on the issue in Cape Town, South Africa from Apr. 27-30, 1997).
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to eliminate the practice. Looking to IHL, Additional Protocols I and
II to the Geneva Conventions prohibit the recruitment of child
soldiers: Article 77(2) of Additional Protocol I prohibits recruitment
of soldiers under fifteen-years-old and imposes an obligation on
parties to a conflict to ensure that children under fifteen are not
directly participating in hostilities; Article 4(3)(c) of Additional
Protocol II also stipulates that children under fifteen should neither
be recruited to armed forces or permitted to participate in hostilities.9
Article 4 of Additional Protocol II is widely regarded as being
customary international law.10 Other IHL instruments also affirm
these provisions and prohibit the military engagement of children.
The 1991 Memorandum of Understanding on the Application of IHL
between Croatia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
affirms Article 77 of Additional Protocol I, which sets fifteen as the
minimum age of military recruitment.11 The 1992 Agreement on the
Application of IHL between the parties to the Conflict in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, at paragraph 2.3(3), also affirms Article 77 of
Additional Protocol I.12 The Protocol of Agreement between the
Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the
Integration of the Armed Forces of 1993 prohibits the enlistment of
any children who have not reached the age of eighteen years of age.13
9. See Protocol I, supra note 2, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 39; Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 4(3)(c), June 8,
1977 [hereinafter Protocol II].
10. U.N. Secretary-General, Report on the Establishment of a Special Court for
Sierra Leone, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000).
11. Document IV: Memorandum of Understanding on the Procedures for the
Application of the Applicable Rules of International Humanitarian Law by the
Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Serbia and the Armed Forces of the FSR of
Yugoslavia para. 4, Nov. 27, 1991, in CRIMES WITHOUT PUNISHMENT
HUMANITARIAN ACTION IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 195, 196 (Michèle Mercier ed.,
1995).
12. Document VI: Agreement on Respect for the Rules of International
Humanitarian Law by the Plenipotentiaries Representing the Parties to the Conflict
in Bosnia-Herzegovina para. 2.3, May 22, 1992, in CRIMES WITHOUT PUNISHMENT
HUMANITARIAN ACTION IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 203, 205 (Michèle Mercier ed.,
1995).
13. Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of
Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Integration of the Armed Forces
of the Two Parties art. 73, Aug. 3, 1993.
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The Military Manuals of a number of states indicates that state
practice is largely in line with obligations under IHL. For example,
Australia sets a minimum voluntary enlistment age of seventeen.14
Canada, France, the U.K., and the U.S. set a minimum voluntary
enlistment age of fifteen years.15 The U.S. also stipulates that
soldiers enlisted who are under eighteen years should not take direct
part in hostilities.16
Looking to IHRL, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and
the Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour both prohibit
recruitment of child soldiers. Article 38(3) of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child stipulates fifteen years as the minimum age of
recruitment, and Article 1 of the Convention on the Worst Forms of
Child Labour proscribes compulsory recruitment of children under
eighteen years of age as one of the worst forms of child labour.17
The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child
on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (Optional
Protocol) states that persons under eighteen years cannot be
compulsorily recruited to armed forces and that voluntary
recruitment of children between fifteen and eighteen years must be
fully informed and with the consent of parents and guardians.18
14. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE, DEFENCE INSTRUCTIONS (GENERAL)
MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE MEMBERS
UNDER 18 YEARS OF AGE para. 14 (2008) (Austl.); AIR CHIEF MARSHAL A.G.
HOUSTON, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT § 9.51 (Australian Defence Headquarters
2006) [hereinafter Australian Manual].
15. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL § 4.20.5.1 (2015) [hereinafter
U.S. MANUAL]; MINISTÈRE DE LA DÉFENSE, MANUEL DE DROIT DES CONFLITS
ARMÉS [MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT] 37, 49 (2012) (Fr.)
[hereinafter French Manual]; MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE JOINT SERVICES
MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT § 9.9.1 (2004) (U.K.) [hereinafter U.K.
Manual]; OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, THE LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT AT THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS § 1714.1.c (2001) (Can.)
[hereinafter Canadian Manual].
16. See U.S. MANUAL, supra note 15, § 4.20.5.2.
17. Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour art. 1, opened for signature June
17, 1999, 80 Stat. 271, 2133 U.N.T.S. 161 (entered into force Nov. 19, 2000);
Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 38(3), opened for signature Nov. 20,
1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 56 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990) [hereinafter UNCRC].
18. See Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra
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Additionally, the Optional Protocol states that non-state armed
groups may not, regardless of the circumstances, recruit persons
under eighteen years old.19
The crime of recruiting child soldiers is also enforceable under
ICL. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court provides
that “conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years”
into both state and non-state armed groups in both international and
civil armed conflicts is a war crime.20 Similarly, recruitment of
children under fifteen as soldiers was also a war crime under the
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.21

III. BACKGROUND: EVIDENCE OF ISIS’
RECRUITMENT OF CHILD SOLDIERS AND
DIRECT ENGAGEMENT OF
CHILD SOLDIERS IN HOSTILITIES
ISIS uses child soldiers on a level unprecedented by other violent
extremist associations.22 According to Mia Bloom, ISIS’ estimated
more than 1500 child soldiers can be distinguished into five groups:
“those born to foreign fighters or emigrants; those born to local
fighters; those who had been abandoned and found their way into an
ISIS-controlled orphanage; those coercively taken from their parents;
and those who voluntarily joined the Islamic State.” 23 News
organizations have reported on parents in ISIS-controlled territories
note 1, art. 2, 3.
19. Id. art. 4.
20. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 97, opened for signature
July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome
Statute].
21. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 4, Mar. 8, 2002, 2178
U.N.T.S. 145.
22. See Mia Bloom, John Horgan & Charlie Winter, Depictions of Children
and Youth in the Islamic State’s Martyrdom Propaganda, 2015 – 2016, 9 CTC
SENTINEL 29, 29 (2016) (“The Islamic State has so heavily championed the
mobilization of children—on a scale rarely associated even with VEOs [violent
extremist organizations]—that it suggests organizational concerns that far
outweigh short-term propaganda benefits. . . . Indeed, the publicity hungry
organization vividly depicts the wide-ranging and routine participation of children
in its jihadist media projects.”).
23. Mia Bloom, Cubs of the Caliphate: The Children of ISIS, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(July 21, 2015) https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-07-21/cubs-caliphate.
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being forced to surrender their children to ISIS, under the threat of
death, for soldier training.24 In some situations, children in ISIScontrolled territories may choose to join, perceiving that enlisting
will provide them with better opportunities.25 Human Rights Watch
has reported that ISIS has previously detained large groups of
children caught in ground operations and taken these children to
child soldier training camps.26 An Article published in ISIS’
publication, Dabiq, called on mothers to surrender their sons to ISIS,
stating: “As for you, O mother of lion cubs . . . And what will make
you know what the mother of lion cubs is? She is the teacher of
generations and the producer of men.”27 The organization has also
published footage of public “fairs” and forums seeking to attract
potential child soldiers with ideological tools, free confectionary and
bouncing castles.28
Child soldiers have also been recruited through ISIS’ de-facto
control of school systems in occupied areas.29 A report published by
the activist group Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently details the
educational system and curriculum ISIS established after the city of
Raqqa fell to their control in 2014. According to the report, ISISadministered schools allegedly taught only religious doctrine and
24. Joshua Berlinger, ISIS’ Child Soldiers: What Will Happen to the ‘Cubs of
the Caliphate’?, CNN (May 28, 2015), http://edition.cnn.com/2015/05/20/
middleeast/isis-child-soldiers.
25. Id.
26. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, MAYBE WE LIVE AND MAYBE WE DIE:
RECRUITMENT AND USE OF CHILDREN BY ARMED GROUPS IN SYRIA 13 (2014).
27. Erin McLaughlin, How ISIS Recruits Children, Then Kills Them, CNN
(Feb. 22, 2016), http://edition.cnn.com/2016/02/19/middleeast/isis-child-soldiers/.
28. See Camp Jihad: Slushies, Fairground Rides, and Shari’a Law, RADIO
FREE EUR. RADIO LIBERTY (Apr. 20, 2015, 5:01 PM), https://www.rferl.org/
a/camp-jihad-slushies-fairground-rides-sharia-law/26968413.html; see also John
Horgan & Mia Bloom, This Is How the Islamic State Manufactures Child
Militants, VICE NEWS (July 8, 2015, 9:23 AM), https://news.vice.com/article/thisis-how-the-islamic-state-manufactures-child-militants; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
supra note 26, at 21.
29. See Katarina Montgomery, ISIS Sets a ‘New Paradigm’ for Child Soldiers:
Ideology, Combat and Forced Marriage, NEWS DEEPLY (Nov. 27, 2014),
https://www.newsdeeply.com/syria/articles/2014/11/27/isis-sets-a-new-paradigmfor-child-soldiers-ideology-combat-and-forced-marriage (asserting that ISIS
militants have changed the school curricula in local communities so that it
coincides with the ISIS ideologies).
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Arabic language, “along with fitness classes which start with
vigorous exercises and then trainings on different types of
weapons.”30 The group also reportedly burnt students’ previous
exercise books and forced pre-existing teachers to undergo
“repentance courses and pledge not to teach the old curriculum.”31
All scientific subjects were banned, though children were reportedly
taught how to make bombs.32 Due to forced conscription of children
via the school system, many families took the risk of fleeing
occupied areas.33 There are furthermore reports of child soldier
“cubs” training camps in both Syria34 and Central Asia.35 To
accommodate and train the children of foreign fighters, ISIS also
reportedly established two military schools for English speaking
children.36
Mia Bloom and John Horgan describe programs of systematic
30. See Abu Mohammed, ISIS Curriculum and Educational System, RAQQA IS
SLAUGHTERED SILENTLY (Sept. 18, 2016), http://www.raqqasl.com/en/?
p=1959.
31. Samuel Osborne, ISIS is Using Schools in Raqqa to ‘Brainwash Children
and Train Them With Weapons’, INDEP. (Sept. 18, 2016, 1:25 PM),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-islamic-state-daeshschools-raqqa-brainwash-children-a7315071.html.
32. See id.
33. See Omar Abdallah, In Raqqa’s Training Camps, ISIS Teaches Children
How to Behead, NEWS DEEPLY (Sept. 2, 2014), https://www.newsdeeply.com/syria
/articles/2014/09/02/in-raqqas-training-camps-isis-teaches-children-how-tobehead.
34. See Tim Arango, A Boy in ISIS. A Suicide Vest. A Hope to Live., N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 26, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/27/world/middleeast/
syria-isis-recruits-teenagers-as-suicide-bombers.html (asserting that at one of these
“cubs” camps, children are trained to fight “hate-filled Shiites”); see also Lizzie
Dearden, Isis Is Using Far More Child Soldiers Than the World Realised, INDEP.
(Feb. 19, 2016, 10:01 AM), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middleeast/isis-using-more-child-fighters-than-feared-as-suicide-bombers-and-soldiersafter-brainwashing-at-a6883626.html (surmising that children in these camps are
sent home with dolls dressed in orange clothing and instructed to behead them as
homework).
35. See Joanna Paraszczuk, Kazakh IS Militant Posts Photos of Central Asian
‘Caliphate Cubs’, RADIO FREE EUR. RADIO LIBERTY (June 16, 2015, 1:51 PM),
https://www.rferl.org/a/islamic-state-militant-posts-photos-of-kids/27075404.html
(providing that an ISIS militant has posted numerous photographs of Central Asian
children to his social media account, alleging that these children are ethnic
Kyrgyz).
36. See Horgan & Bloom, supra note 28.
BEING
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indoctrination and desensitization to extreme violence used by ISIS
against its child soldiers.37 Children are encouraged to observe
public executions, stoning, and crucifixions, to foster rationalization
and acceptance of extreme violence as being an appropriate form of
punishment against “traitors” and “non-believers.”38 Escaped former
child soldiers describe being told by their captors that their ISIS
handlers were now their only family and reported children as young
as five-years-old being forced to undertake intensive military
training39 with those who refused to participate being subjected to
beatings.40 Footage uploaded by ISIS members shows children
younger than ten years old being shot at with ostensibly live
ammunition whilst crawling under barbed wire during training
exercises.41 Children are trained to “take captives, serve as snipers,
and ambush moving vehicles.”42 Families fleeing the region report
their children having been sent home from training schools with
“caucasian dolls dressed in orange jumpsuits to behead as
‘homework.’”43
ISIS is unusual in that it uses its child soldiers in a similar manner
to its use of adult soldiers.44 A 2014 Human Rights Watch
investigation reported that “both children and adults who fought with
ISIS consistently reported seeing children thirteen years old or
younger undergoing the same training and performing the same
military duties as adults.”45 Children wear the same uniform as adult
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See Nima Elbagir & Peter Wilkinson, ‘Like Coming Back to Life’ Says
Child Soldier Who Escaped ISIS, CNN (Jan. 12, 2016), http://edition.cnn.com
/2016/01/12/middleeast/isis-child-soldiers/ (reporting that that child soldiers were
told that the fighters loved them and would take care of them better than their own
parents).
40. See id. (describing a boy whose leg was broken in three places for
disobedience).
41. See Joanna Paraszczuk, ‘Next Generation’ Stars in IS Terror-Training
Video of ‘Caliphate Cub’, RADIO FREE EUR. RADIO LIBERTY (Oct. 18, 2015),
https://www.rferl.org/a/islamic-state-children-terror-training-video/27312748.html.
42. See Horgan & Bloom, supra note 28.
43. Dearden, supra note 34; see Abdallah, supra note 33.
44. See Bloom, Horgan & Winter, supra note 22, at 31 (asserting that children
are fighting right alongside adult males).
45. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 26, at 21-22.

2018]

WHAT IF GOLIATH KILLED DAVID?

581

ISIS fighters and are encouraged to imitate older fighters.46 ISIS’
child soldiers are deployed as “fighters and guards, recruiters and
bomb makers,”47 and have been filmed performing executions.48 In
March 2015, a video shared by ISIS on social media depicted a
group of adolescent ISIS soldiers participating in the mass beheading
of a group of Alawite prisoners.49 In December 2015, a group of
young boys were shown in a propaganda film playing ISIS “hideand-seek” and were filmed “running through the ruins of a castle in
eastern Syria, racing each other to kill one of the handful of captives
who were tied up and defenseless inside.”50 ISIS’ child soldiers also
perform suicide attack missions, and a former child soldier told
Human Rights Watch that there is “social pressure to do so.”51 An
escaped child soldier by the name of Usaid told the New York Times
about being taken from Syria to Baghdad to perform a suicide
operation, where he surrendered himself to security at the mosque he
had been instructed to bomb.52 In January 2016, the group uploaded
propaganda photos of an eleven-year-old boy kissing his father’s
46. See Bloom, supra note 23.
47. Horgan & Bloom, supra note 28; see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note
26, at 26 (stating that children had to have a “military lesson on how to use
weapons, then a religious lesson, then noon prayer, then lessons on how to make
and use hand bombs and mines”).
48. See Berlinger, supra note 24 (stating that a boy in a unit was seen standing
in front of and shooting a man who was on his knees); see also Lizzie Dearden, Isis
Propaganda Video Shows British Four-Year-Old Isa Dare ‘Blowing Up Car’ with
Prisoners Inside in Syria, INDEP. (Feb. 11, 2016, 6:34 AM),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-execution-videoshows-british-four-year-old-isa-dare-blowing-up-car-with-prisoners-insidea6866626.html (providing that a four-year-old from London was seen in a
propaganda video which showed three men strapped to a car and then blown up,
and in a separate video a boy was shown appearing to press a detonator button
blowing up a car).
49. See Joanna Paraszczuk, Islamic State’s Teenage ‘Caliphate Cubs’ Appear
in New Killing Video, RADIO FREE EUR. RADIO LIBERTY (Mar. 30, 2015, 1:21 PM),
https://www.rferl.org/a/islamic-state-beheading-video-killing-videoalawites/26928149.html.
50. See Charlie Winter, Shocked By the ‘Cubs of the Caliphate’? Of Course
You Are—That’s ISIS’s Plan, GUARDIAN (Jan. 5, 2016, 8:17 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jan/05/cubs-of-caliphate-isischildren-videos-propaganda.
51. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 26, at 23.
52. See Arango, supra note 34.
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hand before undertaking a suicide mission against a truck of
explosives.53
Charlie Winter has predicted that ISIS’ engagement of child
soldiers is part of a long-term strategy to ensure the longevity of the
group, as rates of adult foreign recruits increasingly dwindle.
According to Winter, “ISIS is integrating children into its project in a
way that is more reminiscent of a state than a non-state actor. It’s
thinking with the long term in mind.”54

IV. THE COALITION TO COUNTER ISIS
There are sixty-seven state participants in the US-led Coalition to
Counter ISIS.55 As of late 2016, the states with the largest military
contributions were:
1. Australia: 380 personnel engaged advising Iraqi counterterrorist
units, and were also undertaking airstrikes against targets in both Iraq and
Syria. 400 Australian personnel were also engaged in support of the air
missions.56
2. Belgium: thirty-five personnel engaged in a training and advisory
capacity, was undertaking airstrike operations in Iraq, and had 120
personnel engaged in a support capacity.57

53. See McLaughlin, supra note 27.
54. Id.; see also Bloom, Horgan & Winter, supra note 22, at 32 (asserting that
today’s child militants are tomorrow’s adult terrorists); Winter, supra note 50
(explaining that children are a fundamental part of ISIS’ long term strategy
because they are venerated as the inheritors of the ISIS jihad).
55. The Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS: Partners, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/s/seci/c72810.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2018) (including the
following: Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, Somalia, Tunisia, Canada, Panama, United
States, Afghanistan, Australia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South
Korea, Taiwan, Albania, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Cyrus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom,
Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates).
56. KATHLEEN J. MCINNIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44135, COALITION
CONTRIBUTIONS TO COUNTERING THE ISLAMIC STATE 8 (2016).
57. Id.
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3. Canada: 210 personnel engaged in a training and advisory capacity,
and 640 personnel engaged in support of air missions including aerial
surveillance and intelligence.58
4. France: 1000 personnel engaged in a training and advising capacity,
undertook airstrike operations, and had an additional 1000 people
engaged in a mission support capacity.59
5. U.K.: 400 personnel engaged in a training and advisory capacity, and
undertook airstrikes.60
6. U.S.: the “largest contributor of material and personnel resources to
the coalition,” with 4,647 personnel authorized to engage in training and
advising operations in Iraq, and 300 personnel authorized for Syria, and
has undertaken airstrike operations in both Iraq and Syria.61

Regional allies Turkey and Saudi Arabia are also members of the
coalition. Turkey undertook airstrike operations in both Syria and
Iraq as well as “long-range artillery strikes in northern Iraq and
Syria.”62 Saudi Arabia conducted airstrike operations in Syria with
an unspecified number of aircraft.63
The coalition campaign has been characterized by airstrikes
against strategic points. According to the U.S. Department of State,
“the Coalition has conducted more than 13,500 airstrikes in both Iraq
and Syria.”64 Airstrikes aim at “destroying their infrastructure,
reducing their ability to generate financial support and impeding
their command and control.”65 Coalition strikes have targeted ISIS
vehicles, known ISIS-held buildings, fighting positions, mortar
positions, rocket rails, weapons storage facilities and caches,
bunkers, tunnel systems, tactical units, and staging areas.66 Coalition
58. Id.
59. Id. at 11.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. MCINNIS, supra note 56, at 11.
63. Id. at 10.
64. Fact Sheet: The Global Coalition to Counter Daesh, U.S. DEP’T OF ST.
(July 21, 2016), https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/seci/261626.htm.
65. Id.
66. See Coalition Airstrikes Target ISIL Terrorists in Iraq, Syria, U.S. DEP’T
OF DEF. (Oct. 14, 2015), https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/622993/
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forces have also targeted a health clinic that ISIS forces were
positioned inside and, allegedly, a mosque; both strikes resulted in
civilian casualties.67 Multiple news sources describe ISIS’ child
soldiers being killed as a result of coalition airstrikes.68 A French
airstrike against an ISIS camp in Eastern Syria in September 2015
was reported to have killed twelve child soldiers.69
coalition-airstrikes-target-isil-terrorists-in-iraq-syria (noting destruction of
homemade explosives cache, tactical units, buildings, and fighting positions);
Coalition Airstrikes Continue Against ISIL Targets in Syria, Iraq, U.S. DEP’T OF
DEF. (Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/621806/
coalition-airstrikes-continue-against-isil-targets-in-syria-iraq (listing strikes on
ISIS tactical units, vehicles, buildings, fighting position, rocket rails, and weapon
storage facility); Coalition Continues Airstrikes Against ISIL Targets in Syria,
Iraq, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Mar. 15, 2015), https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/
Article/604281 (listing destruction of ISIS tactical unit, excavators, vehicles, and
staging area); see also Iraq: Anti-ISIS Strike Harms 12 Civilians, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/01/26/iraq-anti-isisstrike-harms-12-civilians (asserting that an anti-ISIS airstrike carried out on a
vehicle by either the United States-led coalition or Iraqi government forces killed
one civilian and injured 11 others); Lizzie Dearden, Official Total of Civilians
Killed by US-Led Coalition Air Strikes Against Isis in Syria and Iraq rises to 188,
INDEP. (Jan. 3, 2017), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isisair-strikes-syria-iraq-civilian-casualties-killed-us-led-coalition-america-britainfrance-total-a7508031.html (highlighting that the official total of civilians killed by
the United States-led coalition’s anti-ISIS airstrikes is 188).
67. Iraq: Airstrike Hits Clinic, 8 Civilians Died, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Nov. 29,
2016), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/29/iraq-airstrike-hits-clinic-8-civiliansdied; Iraq: Investigate Mosque Strike that Killed Civilians, HUM. RTS. WATCH
(Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/24/iraq-investigate-mosquestrike-killed-civilians.
68. See More Than 50 Daesh Child Soldiers Killed in 2015: Monitor, SYRIAN
OBSERVATORY FOR HUM. RTS. (July 16, 2015), http://www.syriahr.com/
en/?p=25055 (noting that at least 52 child soldiers under the age of sixteen were
killed in the first part of 2015); Scores of ISIL Child Soldiers ‘Killed’ in Syria in
2015, AL JAZEERA (July 15, 2015), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/07/
scores-isil-child-soldiers-killed-syria-2015-150715132745980.html (claiming that
as many as thirty-one child soldiers were killed in July 2015 in explosions, clashes,
and airstrikes by the US-led coalition and Syria’s regime).
69. French Strike in Syria Kills 30 Jihadists, Says Monitor Group, T IMES OF
ISR. (Sept. 30, 2015, 12:58 PM), http://www.timesofisrael.com/french-strike-insyria-kills-30-jihadists-says-monitor-group (reporting that France’s first airstrike in
Syria as part of the US-led coalition killed at least thirty ISIS fighters including
twelve child soldiers); French Syria Raid ‘Killed 12 Child Soldiers’, RADIO FREE
EUR. RADIO LIBERTY (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.rferl.org/a/syria-french-airstrike-kills-12-child-soldiers/27279701.html; IS Conflict: French Raid in Syria
‘Kills 12 Child Soldiers’, BBC (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
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Notably, Iraq is also a member of the coalition, with members of
their forces being trained by the powerful states listed above. Iraqi
forces are conducting ground operations.70 In October 2016, more
than 300 ISIS child soldiers were killed when Iraqi government
forces and their allies initiated an offensive seeking to retake the city
of Mosul in northern Iraq.71 Child soldiers formed the majority of
ISIS combatants killed, with 180 adult fighters also being killed.72
Bloom, Horgan, and Winter analyzed ISIS propaganda eulogizing
child soldiers for the period of January 2015 to January 2016, and
outlined the primary ways in which the child soldiers were killed.73
They found that of the eighty-nine children eulogized, thirty-nine
percent died in suicide missions where they detonated a vehicleborne improvised explosive device against a target,74 thirty-three
percent died in operations as foot-soldiers, six percent died as
propagandists embedded in units, and four percent died in suicide
missions against civilian targets.75 The remaining eighteen percent
were killed in “marauding operations in which a group of mostly
adult fighters infiltrates and attacks an enemy position using light
automatic weapons before killing themselves by detonating suicide
belts.”76
With the above in mind, the following may be deduced for the
purpose of analysis:
1.

Coalition forces conducting airstrikes against ISIS targets may do so

middle-east-34399638.
70. See MCINNIS, supra note 56, at 2-3 (explaining that the U.S. and coalition
forces should be focused on supporting Iraqi ground forces rather than engaging in
ground combat themselves).
71. Matt Payton, More Than 300 ISIS Child Soldiers Have Been Killed in
Mosul, Human Rights Watchdog Reports, INDEP. (Oct. 30, 2016),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-child-soldiers-mosulsyria-300-hundred-a7388166.html.
72. Id.
73. Bloom, Horgan & Winter, supra note 22, at 29 (claiming that the majority
of images of children soldiers eulogized were sourced from ISIS propagandists on
twitter).
74. Id. at 30.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 31.

586

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[33:3

with knowledge of there being child soldiers present at those targets;77
and,
2. Coalition partner Iraq, in conducting ground combat operations, will
encounter ISIS child soldier adversaries.78

V. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
PROTECTIONS OF CHILD SOLDIERS
DURING CONFLICT
The International Law of Human Rights is composed of those
human rights treaties that can be established to jurisdictionally apply
to members of the coalition in Iraq and Syria, as well as Customary
International Law (CIL). The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR)79 is a political declaration and not a treaty; however,
many of its provisions are binding upon states to the extent that they
reflect CIL.80 The Human Rights Committee has been firm in its
77. See French Strike in Syria Kills 30 Jihadists, Says Monitor Group, supra
note 69 (citing French President Francios Hollande as stating that more airstrikes
could hit an ISIS training camp where twelve child soldiers were killed by previous
strikes); French Syria Raid ‘Killed 12 Child Soldiers’, supra note 69; IS Conflict:
French Raid in Syria ‘Kills 12 Child Soldiers’, supra note 69 (reporting since June
that children as young as thirteen or fourteen years old were being trained in the
camp that was targeted by France in July).
78. See Payton, supra note 71 (asserting that Iraqi forces and their allies killed
over 300 ISIS child soldiers in the first two weeks of their offensive on Mosul).
79. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10,
1948).
80. See ERIC A. HEINZE, WAGING HUMANITARIAN WAR: THE ETHICS, LAW,
AND POLITICS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 65 (2009) (explaining that the
UDHR is not binding, but can offer evidence of customary international law if
consistently practiced by states); John P. Humphrey, The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights: Its History, Impact and Judicial Character, in HUMAN RIGHTS
THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION 21, 37 (B.G. Ramcharan ed.,
1979) (arguing that the UDHR “is the only instrument universally applicable to all
states which catalogues and defines the human rights and fundamental freedoms”
that the U.N. Charter binds states to respect, and that nonmember states must
respect because it is customary international law); Jochen von Bernstorff, The
Changing Fortunes of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Genesis and
Symbolic Dimensions of the Turn in Rights in International Law, 19 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 903, 913 (2008) (recalling that the UDHR’s status of customary international
law developed from the abundance of references to it in later UN documents and
state practices following its principles).

2018]

WHAT IF GOLIATH KILLED DAVID?

587

position that IHRL is not ceded in situations of armed conflict.81
There are several treaties that are significant in this context for
members of the coalition. Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Iraq,
Syria, Turkey, the U.K., and the U.S. are all parties to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).82
Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and the
U.K. are all parties to the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CROC).83 The U.S. is not a party to the CROC as it has not yet
ratified the treaty, however, the U.S. did sign the treaty in 1995.84
The extent to which the obligations raised by these treaties apply
to coalition members in their engagement in Iraq and Syria varies
depending on each member’s degree of engagement. The ICCPR is
applies both within a state party’s territory and in regards to
individuals “subject to its jurisdiction.”85 The CROC also applies to
each child within state parties’ “jurisdiction.”86 “Jurisdiction” is not
synonymous with the territorial boundaries of the state party, or with
the jurisdiction of its courts. Rather, jurisdiction has more to do
with individuals and areas within the effective control of a state
party. For instance, the Human Rights Committee has clarified that
the obligations of state parties apply extra-territorially, to persons
within the “power or effective control of that State Party, even if not
81. See Human Rights Comm., General Comment No.31 [80], The Nature of
the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 11,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.1326 (Mar. 29, 2004) (stating that the Covenant
applies in “situations of armed conflict” and that Covenant rights and rules of
international humanitarian law are “complementary, not mutually exclusive”); see
also Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Committee: Australia, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/AUS/CO/5 (May 7, 2009)
[hereinafter Concluding Observations] (emphasizing the Committee’s concern that
several provisions of the Australian Anti-Terrorism Act are incompatible with the
Covenant).
82. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
83. UNCRC, supra note 17.
84. Office for the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Status of Ratification
Interactive Dashboard: Convention on the Rights of the Child, UNITED NATIONS
(Feb. 19, 2018), http://indicators.ohchr.org/.
85. ICCPR, supra note 82, at 173.
86. UNCRC, supra note 17, at 46.
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situated within the territory of the State Party.”87 Situations where
states have used military force outside of their borders, such as to
transfer refugees on a military vessel, have been found to amount to
“effective control.”88 The Human Rights Committee has also
confirmed that states can be accountable under the ICCPR “for the
actions of their authorities outside their own territories, including in
occupied territories.”89
Additionally, coalition members should always be aware of the
IHRL obligations of their regional partners. The coalition is working
in partnership with the Iraqi government to regain its territory, a
significant element of its mandate being to train Iraqi personnel.90
Because Iraq is a signatory to the above treaties, all of its actions are
subject to their jurisdiction.91 Noting that Syria is also a party to the
above conventions, the Coalition has also previously supported
certain Syrian rebel groups—including the Kurdish Democratic
Union Party92—by providing training and equipment.93 According to
87. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31, supra note 81, ¶ 10.
88. See Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 37 (discussing the
Human Rights Committee’s condemnation of the Italian practice of “intercepting
boats full of migrants on the high seas and pushing them back to Libya without the
required screening”).
89. Concluding Observations, supra note 81, ¶ 11.
90. Jim Michaels, How the U.S.-Led Coalition Transformed Iraq’s Army into a
Fighting
Force,
USA
TODAY
(Oct.
19,
2016,
3:27
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/10/19/united-states-ledcoalition-iraq-military-islamic-state/92415314/ (discussing coalition efforts to
teach “infantry, armor and tank skills to Iraqi soldiers” and to help commanders
“direct large combat formations . . . during complex operations”).
91. Cf. MCINNIS, supra note 56, at 1-2 (explaining that Iraq is a member of the
coalition to counter the Islamic State, and describing the legal basis for the
coalition).
92. Emile Hokayem, Obama’s Disastrous Betrayal of the Syrian Rebels,
FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 5, 2016, 3:21 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/
02/05/obamas-disastrous-betrayal-of-the-syrian-rebels/.
93. W.J. Hennigan, Pentagon to Try Against Training Syrian Rebels, L.A.
TIMES (Mar. 17, 2016, 8:06 AM), http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fgpentagon-syria-20160317-story.html; Tara McKelvey, Arming Syrian Rebels:
Where the US Went Wrong, BBC (Oct. 10, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/
magazine-33997408; Paul McLeary, The Pentagon Wasted $500 Million Training
Syrian Rebels. It’s About to Try Again., FOREIGN POL’Y (Mar. 18, 2016, 3:05 PM),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/18/pentagon-wasted-500-million-syrian-rebels/;
Syria: Abductions, Torture and Summary Killings at the Hands of Armed Groups,
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the International Law Commission, “the conduct of an insurrectional
movement which becomes the new government of a State shall be
considered an act of that State under international law,”94 meaning
that the group “will also be held responsible, as a state, for their
unlawful acts committed while they were a non-state actor.”95
The UDHR, ICCPR, and CROC all affirm a right to life.96 The
ICCPR provides that “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
life,”97 and in signing the CROC, state parties “recognize that every
child has the inherent right to life.”98 The CROC also obliges state
parties to “ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival and
development of the child.”99 None of the treaties provide an
exception to this provision. Consequently, it is reasonable to deduce
that, where military actions deprive ISIS child soldiers of their right
to life, they are acting in violation of IHRL.
There are a number of other IHRL provisions that are inconsistent
with coalition forces knowingly targeting ISIS’ child soldiers. The
UDHR and ICCPR have provisions against “cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment” of persons.100 The CROC, in
Article 19, obliges state parties to protect children from “all forms of
physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent
treatment.”101 Article 37 prohibits “cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment,” capital punishment of children, and
arbitrary deprivation of liberty.102 The CROC also obliges state
parties to provide “special protection” to children who are
AMNESTY INT’L (July 5, 2016), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/07/
syria-abductions-torture-and-summary-killings-at-the-hands-of-armed-groups/.
94. G.A. Res. 56/83, art. 10(1) (Jan. 28, 2002).
95. Andrew Clapham, Human rights obligations of non-state actors in conflict
situations, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 491, 508 (2006).
96. ICCPR, supra note 82, at 32 (“Every human being has the inherent right to
life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of
life.”); G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 79, art. 3 (“Everyone has the right to life,
liberty and the security of person.”); UNCRC, supra note 17, at 47 (“States Parties
recognize that every child has the inherent right to life.”).
97. ICCPR, supra note 82, at 32.
98. UNCRC, supra note 17, at 47.
99. Id.
100. ICCPR, supra note 82, at 33; G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 79, art. 5.
101. UNCRC, supra note 17, at 50.
102. Id. at 55.

590

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[33:3

“temporarily or permanently deprived of his or her family
environment,”103 to provide children with access to health care
services,104 and to take appropriate measures to ensure children have
a “standard of living adequate for the child’s physical, mental,
spiritual, moral and social development.”105

VI. ARE CHILD SOLDIERS LAWFUL MILITARY
OBJECTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW?
The conflict in Iraq and Syria involves a “resort to armed force
between two or more states” and is consequently considered an
international armed conflict under IHL.106 As an international armed
conflict, coalition members to the conflict are subject to the
provisions of the four Geneva Conventions, and Additional Protocol
I.107 Much of IHL forms customary international law, which binds
state and non-state parties to the conflict equally.108 Customary IHL
is collated by the International Committee of the Red Cross.109
103. Id. at 52.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 53.
106. INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, HOW IS THE TERM “ARMED CONFLICT” DEFINED
IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW? 5 (2008); see Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case
No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (“We
find that an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between
States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and
organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.”).
107. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in
Armies in the Field art. 2, Aug. 22, 1864, T.S. No. 337; Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 87 (“The present
Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties. . . .”);
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 136; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter
Fourth Geneva Convention]; Protocol I, supra note 2, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 222 (“This
Protocol, which supplements the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the
protection of war victims, shall apply in the situations referred to in Article 2
common to those Conventions.”).
108. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 1, at xxxi.
109. Id. (asserting that the International Committee of the Red Cross initiated
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Children are provided with special status in IHL. Rule 135 of
Customary IHL establishes that children who are affected by armed
conflict “are entitled to special respect and protection.”110 This rule
is grounded in a number of provisions. Article 23 of the Geneva
Convention IV places an obligation on states to permit free passage
of “foodstuffs, clothing and tonics” to children under fifteen years of
age,111 and article 24 obliges states to step in to protect children under
fifteen who are orphaned or separated from their families as a result
of conflict, so that they are “not left to their own resources.”112
Article 70(1) of Additional Protocol I provides that “in the
distribution of relief consignments” priority should be given to
children113 and 77(1) provides that “children shall be the object of
special respect.”114
Article 77(1) was affirmed by both the
Memorandum of Understanding on the Application of IHL between
Croatia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the
Agreement on the Application of IHL between the Parties to the
Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.115
To the extent that children are civilians, they are protected by the
fundamental doctrine of IHL: the principle of distinction. Rule 1 of
Customary IHL holds that parties to a conflict “must at all times
distinguish between civilians and combatants” and that “attacks may
only be directed against combatants” and not civilians.116 Rule 1 has
its basis in the preamble of the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration,
which holds that “the only legitimate object which States should
endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces

the creation of the four Geneva Conventions).
110. Id. at 479-82.
111. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 107, 75 U.N.T.S. at 303-04.
112. Id. at 304.
113. Protocol I, supra note 2, 1125 U.N.T.S. art. 70(1).
114. Id. art. 77(1).
115. Memorandum of Understanding on the Application of International
Humanitarian Law between Croatia and the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia para. 4, Croat.-Yugoslavia, Nov. 27, 1991 [hereinafter Memorandum
Croatia and Yugoslavia] (“All civilians shall be treated in accordance with Articles
72 to 79 of Additional Protocol I.”); Agreement on the Application of IHL between
the Parties to the Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina para. 2.3, May 22, 1992
[hereinafter Agreement Bosnia and Herzegovina].
116. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 1, at 3.
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of the enemy.”117 Article 22 of the 1863 Lieber Code also calls for a
“distinction between the private individual belonging to a hostile
country and the hostile country itself, with its men in arms,”118 and
article 1 of the 1880 Oxford Manual provides that “acts of violence”
are only permitted “between the armed forces of belligerent
states.”119 Article 25 of the Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907
also prohibits the attack of undefended civilian buildings, such as
“towns, villages, [and] dwellings [“habitations” in the 1899
document].”120 Article 48 of Additional Protocol I of 1977 codifies
the principle of distinction.121
If a party to a conflict does not distinguish between civilian and
military objects, they are in clear violation of IHL. Rule 11 of
Customary IHL provides that attacks that do not discriminate
between civilian and military objects are prohibited.122 This is
codified by Article 51(4) of Additional Protocol I which holds that
“indiscriminate attacks are prohibited,” and Article 85(3)(b) which
provides that it is a grave breach of the protocol for a party to a
conflict to launch “an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian
population or civilian objects in the knowledge that such attack will
cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian
objects.”123 The military manuals of coalition member states all
affirm the prohibition on indiscriminate attacks.124
117. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles
Under 4000 Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, 18 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser.
1) 474, 138 Consol. T.S. 297.
118. FRANCIS LIEBER, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE
UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD art. 22 (New York: D. Van Nostrand 1863),
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lieber.asp.
119. THE LAWS OF WAR ON LAND, OXFORD: INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
art 1 (1880), https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/140?OpenDocument.
120. Hague II, supra note 2, at 257; Hague IV, supra note 2, at 648.
121. Protocol I, supra note 2, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 25 (“In order to ensure respect
for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the
conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly
shall direct their operations only against military objectives.”).
122. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 1, at 37.
123. Protocol I, supra note 1, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26, 41.
124. Australian Manual, supra note 14, §§ 5.21, 6.26, 9.22; J. MAES, DROIT
PÉNAL ET DISCIPLINAIRE MILITAIRE ET DROIT DE LA GUERRE [CRIMINAL LAW AND
MILITARY DISCIPLINE AND LAW OF WAR] 27 (Ecole Royale Militaire 1983)
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Rule 15 of Customary IHL places a significant burden on armed
forces to ensure that civilians are not being targeted, providing that
“constant care must be taken to spare the civilian population,
civilians and civilian objects” and that “all feasible precautions must
be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimise, incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.”125
This rule has its basis in Article 2(3) of the 1907 Hague Convention
IX,126 and is codified in Article 57(1) of Additional Protocol I, which
also imbues a burden of “constant care” onto parties to a conflict.127
The military manuals of coalition member states also echo these
provisions. For example, both Australia’s 1994 Defense Force
Manual and its 2006 Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) Manual
mirror the burden of “constant care.”128 Canada’s 2001 LOAC
Manual also provides the standard that “care should always be taken
to spare civilians and civilian objects.”129 France’s LOAC Manual
and the United States’ 1976 Air Force manual additionally establish
an onus of “constant care” to spare civilians from attack.130
However, are ISIS’ child soldiers civilians for the purposes of the
principle of distinction? Provisions indicate that when a child
becomes a combatant they lose the protections of being children and
civilians. Civilians are defined in Customary IHL by Rule 5 as
“persons who are not members of the armed forces,”131 a definition
that is codified in Article 50 of Additional Protocol I.132 The military
(Belg.); Canadian Manual, supra note 15, § 416(1); French Manual, supra note 15,
at 85; U.K. Manual, supra note 15, § 12.26; GEORGE N. WALNE, AFP 110-31:
INTERNATIONAL LAW-THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS
AND THE LINEBACKER BOMBING CAMPAIGNS OF THE VIETNAM WAR 5 (Center for
Naval Analyses) (1987) (prohibiting attacks against civilian populations).
125. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 1, at 51.
126. Convention Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War art.
2, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2351 (stating that commanders shall take all necessary
measures to ensure that undefended towns suffer as little damage as possible when
time is a factor).
127. Protocol I, supra note 2, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 29.
128. ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE, OPERATIONS LAW FOR RAAF
COMMANDERS § 8.14 (2004) (Austl.); Australian Manual, supra note 14, § 5.61.
129. Canadian Manual, supra note 15, § 411.
130. French Manual, supra note 15, at 31; WALNE, supra note 124, at 5.
131. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 1, at 17.
132. Protocol I, supra note 2, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26; INT’L COMM. OF THE RED
CROSS, DRAFT RULES FOR THE LIMITATION OF THE DANGERS INCURRED BY THE
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manuals of coalition members also follow this definition. Australia’s
2006 LOAC Manual defines a civilian as “any person not belonging
to the armed forces,”133 and Canada’s LOAC Manual defines a
civilian as “any person who is not a combatant.”134
In practice, military uniform and the carrying of weapons have
been found to be the principle markers distinguishing combatants
from civilians. For instance, the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, in its 2007 Trial Chamber Judgement in
Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević,135 noted “[t]he generally accepted
practice is that combatants distinguish themselves by wearing
uniforms or, at the least, a distinctive sign, and by carrying their
weapons openly.”136 In 2006, the War Crimes division of the
Appellate Panel of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina additionally
held that the absence of a uniform and arms should “indisputably
indicate” that persons are civilians.137
Notably, ISIS’ child soldiers are depicted in ISIS propaganda as
wearing similar uniforms to adult soldiers,138 and a video uploaded
by the organization to social media in September 2016 depicts child
soldiers as carrying and firing large firearms.139 Additionally, reports
indicate that ISIS deploys its child combatants much in the same way
as it does adult combatants.140 For these reasons, the principle of
distinction does little to protect ISIS’ child soldiers from the acts of
CIVILIAN POPULATION IN TIME OF WAR 8 (1956); Draft Convention for the
Protection of Civilian Populations Against New Engines of War art. 1, 1938, Int’l
Law. Assoc. 19498, http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/4fbdff/.
133. Australian Manual, supra note 14, § 9.14.
134. Canadian Manual, supra note 15, § 424.
135. Prosecutor v. Milošević, IT-98-29/1-T, Judgement, ¶ 946 (Dec. 12, 2007).
136. Id. (adding that, in case of doubt, the person is assumed to be a civilian).
137. Prosecutor v. Maktouf, Case No. KPŽ 32/05, Ct. of Bosn. & Herz. 359, 362
(Apr. 4, 2006) (articulating factors that indicate a civilian: location, dress, and
whether they are armed).
138. E.g., Bloom, supra note 23 (decrying the use of child soldiers).
139. See Chris Hughes & Sam Webb, Vile footage shows heavily armed ISIS
child soldiers on the battlefield in Syria, MIRROR (Sept. 7, 2016, 6:18 PM),
https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/innocence-lost-vile-footage-shows8787758.
140. See Bloom, Horgan & Winter, supra note 22, at 31 (examining the similar
patterns of target types and patterns of involvement between adult and child
combatants).
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coalition forces as they are unlikely to be distinguished as civilians
under IHL given their wearing of uniforms, bearing arms, and
engagement as combatants.
Similarly, ISIS’ child soldiers are not protected as civilians under
IHL as they are actively engaged in hostilities, by being deployed as
if adults.141 Under Rule 6 of Customary IHL, civilians lose
protection from attack under IHL when they voluntarily take a direct
part in hostilities.142 The rule is codified in article 51(3) of
Additional Protocol I.143 The military manuals of coalition members
also affirm this rule. The Australian LOAC Manual of 2006
provides that “civilians are only protected as long as they refrain
from taking a direct part in hostilities.”144 Canada’s 2001 LOAC
manual asserts, “civilians who take a direct part in hostilities . . . are
unlawful combatants. They lose their protection as civilians and
become legitimate targets for such a time as they take a direct part in
hostilities.”145 At the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, in the case of Prosecutor v. Kupreskić,146 the Trial
Chamber held that “if a group of civilians takes up arms in an
occupied territory and engages in fighting against the enemy
belligerent, they may be legitimately attacked by the enemy
belligerent. . . .”147
Indeed, whilst IHL is clear that child soldiers should not be
permitted to participate in hostilities—under Rule 137 of Customary
IHL and Article 77(2) of Additional Protocol I148—IHL does not
141. See Bloom, supra note 23 (detailing how children learn sophisticated
military techniques, such as sniper training).
142. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 1, at 20 (advancing the
importance of Article 51 over any reservations).
143. Protocol I, supra note 2, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 37 (“Civilians shall enjoy the
protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct
part in hostilities.”).
144. Australian Manual, supra note 14, § 5.36.
145. Canadian Manual, supra note 15, § 318.1.
146. IT-95-16-T, Judgement, ¶ 523 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Jan. 14, 2000), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kupreskic/tjug/en/kup-tj000114e.pdf.
147. Id.
148. See Protocol I, supra note 2, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 39 (asserting signatory
parties’ duties to limit child recruitment); Protocol II, supra note 9, at 612;
Agreement Bosnia and Herzegovina, supra note 115, para. 2.3 (according civilians
of Bosnia and Herzegovina protections from hostilities); Memorandum Croatia and
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address the status of child soldiers when they are actively engaged in
hostilities. Some theorists argue the effect of this silence is that child
soldiers, once engaged in hostilities, enjoy only the same rights as
adult combatants. For instance, Matthew Happold stated, “[W]hen
participating in hostilities children are no more privileged than any
other combatant. There are no additional rules restricting what the
forces of an adverse power may do to them. They may be shot,
shelled, bombed or bayoneted just as may any other combatant.”149
Joanna Nicholson similarly states that “[a]lthough children, including
child soldiers, are entitled to special protection under IHL, no treaty
provision addresses the specific issue of targeting and child soldiers,
leading to the presumption that child soldiers may be targeted in the
same way as their adult counterparts under IHL.”150 According to
Alex Sinha, “As combatants . . . [child soldiers] may very well pose
a threat, and giving armed forces the power to neutralise that threat is
(as a general matter) compatible with the Geneva Conventions.”151
The United States’ Law of War Manual provides a window into
state practice regarding the status of engaged child soldiers,
addressing how child soldiers should be considered by opposing
forces head-on. According the Manual, “[c]ertain provisions of
treaties and U.S. law seek to restrict the use or recruitment of
children in armed conflict. If children are nonetheless employed in
armed conflict, they generally are treated on the same basis as adults,
although children may be subject to special treatment in detention
because of their age.”152
The practical effect of the above is that coalition forces, under
IHL, may lawfully complete airstrikes and ground strikes against
locations where they have knowledge of child soldiers being present,
Yugoslavia, supra note 115, para. 4 (extending protections to civilians in the power
of the adverse party); HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 1, at 485
(“children must not be allowed to participate in hostilities”).
149. See MATTHEW HAPPOLD, CHILD SOLDIERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 101
(2005).
150. See Joanna Nicholson, Is Targeting Naked Child Soldiers a War Crime? 16
INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 134, 144 (2016).
151. See Alex Sinha, Child Soldiers as Super-privileged Combatants, 17 INT’L J.
HUM. RTS. 584, 590 (2013), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/
13642987.2013.800310?needAccess=true.
152. U.S. MANUAL, supra note 15, § 4.20.5.
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and knowledge that attacking those locations may result in the death
and injury of those child soldiers.

VII. THE NTAGANGA PRE-TRIAL DECISION ON
THE CONFIRMATION OF CHARGES AND THE
STATUS OF CHILD SOLDERS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
A clear gap between IHRL and IHL in regards to the protections
afforded to child soldiers actively engaged in hostilities is evident.
IHRL acknowledges the special status and right to life of children
and imbues state parties to human rights treaties with a responsibility
to step in and protect vulnerable children.153 IHL, on the other hand,
does little to protect child soldiers once they are actively engaged—
where a child performs the adult functions of a combatant, IHL treats
them as such.154
The case of Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda155 is currently in the
trial stage at the International Criminal Court.156 Ntaganda is charged
with 13 counts of war crimes and five counts of crimes against
humanity.157 Counts 6 and 7 are for the rape and sexual slavery of
child soldiers as war crimes pursuant to Article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the
Rome Statute.158 Counts 14, 15, and 16 are for the war crime of the
conscription and enlistment of child soldiers under fifteen-years-old,
and using these child soldiers to participate actively in hostilities.159
In the Decision on the Confirmation of Charges in June 2014, the
153. E.g., UNCRC, supra note 17, art. 3(2), 6(1), 38, 39 (including, inter alia,
the duty of State Parties to maximize the development of children and minimize
any physical or psychological damage caused by armed conflict).
154. E.g., HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 1, at 20.
155. Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Case Information Sheet, (Jan.
2017), https://www.icc-cpi.int/drc/ntaganda/Documents/NtagandaEng.pdf.
156. See id. (justifying its jurisdiction from the Democratic Republic of Congo’s
ratification of the Rome Statute on April 11, 2002).
157. Id.
158. See Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Trial Decision, 28-30, (June
9, 2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2014_04750.PDF (recognizing
that the Chamber must determine whether the Court has jurisdiction over these
charges).
159. See id. at 30-35 (providing the evidence to justify the charges, including
evidence of the recruitment campaign).

598

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[33:3

Pre-Trial Chamber II, in relation to Counts 6 and 7, addressed the
issue of child soldiers under fifteen-years losing their protection
under IHL. The Chamber held:
[T]he mere membership of children under the age of fifteen years in an
armed group cannot be considered as determinative proof of direct/active
participation in hostilities, considering that their presence in the armed
group is specifically proscribed under international law in the first place.
Indeed, to hold that children under the age of fifteen years lose the
protection afforded to them by IHL merely by joining an armed group,
whether as a result of coercion or other circumstances, would contradict
the very rationale underlying the protection afforded to such children
against recruitment and use in hostilities. 160

The Chamber went on to clarify the exact circumstances in which
child soldiers lose protection afforded by IHL:
[C]hildren under the age of fifteen years lose the protection afforded by
IHL only during their direct/active participation in hostilities . . . those
subject to rape and/or sexual enslavement cannot be considered to have
taken active part in hostilities during the specific time when they were
subject to acts of a sexual nature, including rape . . . The sexual character
of these crimes, which involve elements of force/coercion or the exercise
of rights of ownership, logically precludes active participation in
hostilities at the same time. 161

The Chamber’s finding that child soldiers lose their IHL
protections only during “direct/active participation in hostilities” has
real implications for the coalition against ISIS, as does the finding
that IHL protections are engaged when “elements of force/coercion
or the exercise of rights of ownership” are implemented over
children.162 Reports indicate that, in many cases, ISIS’ child soldiers
participate against their will, as a consequence of ISIS’ occupation of
their area,163 and that children participate in training under threat of
160. Id. at 28, ¶ 78.
161. Id. at 29, ¶ 79.
162. Id. at 28-29, ¶¶ 78-79 (limiting the scope of the IHL).
163. See generally Abdallah, supra note 33 (following thirteen-year-old
Mohamed’s experience as an involuntary soldier); Berlinger, supra note 24
(claiming a generation of children are lost due to their conscription as soldiers);
Bloom, supra note 23 (categorizing the children soldiers as follows: those born to
foreign fighters, those born to local fighters, those who were abandoned, those
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physical violence.164
The implications of this decision may be that coalition forces are
prohibited from attacking ISIS child soldier training facilities, where
children are being trained in physically violent situations and often
against their will.165 Additionally, when coalition forces have
knowledge of ISIS’ child soldiers being present at a potential
airstrike target, they will need to make an evaluation of the nature of
the children’s engagement at that location including whether at the
time of the airstrike the children could be considered to be actively
participating in hostilities.

VIII. DO THE ACTS OF CHILD SOLDIERS INCUR
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY?
In December 2016, the United Nations General Assembly voted to
establish the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to
Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Those Responsible for
the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the
Syrian Arab Republic (“the Mechanism”), with a temporal
jurisdiction of those crimes committed since March 2011.166 The
Mechanism will operate under the auspices of the United Nations,
and work in conjunction with the Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, which was
established by the Human Rights Council in 2011.167
The
Mechanism’s mandate is to collect and preserve evidence relating to
taken against their will from their parents, and those who voluntarily joined).
164. See Nima Elbagir & Peter Wilkinson, ‘Like Coming Back to Life’ says
Child Soldier who Escaped ISIS, CNN (Jan. 12, 2016, 5:05 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/12/middleeast/isis-child-soldiers/index.html
(detailing the child’s physical punishment, such as broken legs and starvation).
165. See Abdallah, supra note 33 (detailing how ISIS threatened to kill the
father of a thirteen-year-old boy who was being forced to attend a children’s
training camp); see also Berlinger supra note 24; Bloom, supra note 23 (revealing
that ISIS forces the children to participate in acts so horrendous that their family
members will not allow them to return home).
166. See U.N. General Assembly, International, Impartial and Independent
Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Those Responsible for
the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab
Republic since March 2011, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/71/L.48 (Dec. 19, 2016).
167. Id.
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“violations of international humanitarian law and human rights
violations and abuses” which will support future proceedings “in
national, regional or international courts or tribunals that have or
may in the future have jurisdiction over these crimes, in accordance
with international law.”168
Any future tribunal or court addressing the crimes committed by
ISIS in both Syria and Iraq will be faced with the question of
whether or not ISIS’ former child combatants can and should be held
criminally responsible for their actions.
IHRL does not deal directly with the potential criminal
responsibility of child soldiers, but it does deal with the criminal
responsibility of children in general. Principle 4 of the 1985 “Beijing
Rules” imbues states with an onus not to charge children with crimes
they lack the “moral and psychological components” to commit.169
The 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child, in Article 40(3)(a),
calls for the establishment of a minimum age of criminal
responsibility by state parties, but does not set an age.170 In 2007, the
Committee on the Rights of the Child, relying on the principles
outlined in the “Beijing Rules,” recommended an absolute minimum
age of criminal responsibility of twelve years of age.171 The
Committee also added that a minimum age of criminal responsibility
of between fourteen and sixteen years of age was ideal and would
ensure that “the child’s human rights and legal safeguards are fully
respected.”172 Thus, IHRL is not inconsistent with ISIS’ child
soldiers and former child soldiers being charged with crimes they
committed when they were between twelve and eighteen years of
age.
IHL does guarantee some protections and fair trial rights for
children who are detained and charged for reasons relating to the
conflict, which indicates an assumption that child combatants can be
168. Id.
169. G.A. Res. 40/33, annex, ¶ 4, United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for
the Administration of Juvenile Justice (The Beijing Rules) (Nov. 29, 1985).
170. See UNCRC, supra note 17, at 57.
171. See Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 10:
Children’s Rights in Juvenile Justice on Its 44th Session, U.N. Doc CRC/C/GC/10,
¶ 32 (2007).
172. See id. ¶ 33.
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detained for and charged with violations of IHL. Article 76 of
Geneva Convention IV provides that “proper regard shall be paid to
the special treatment due to minors” in regards to the treatment of
protected persons who are accused of some offence.173 Article 89 of
Geneva Convention IV provides that “children under fifteen years of
age [who are interned] shall be given additional food, in proportion
to their physiological needs.”174 Article 77(4) of Additional Protocol
I also provides that children “shall be held in quarters separate from
the quarters of adults.”175 Article 68 of Geneva Convention IV and
article 77(5) of the Additional Protocol I also provide that the death
penalty shall not be imposed on persons who were under eighteen
years of age at the time of the commission of their offence.176
ICL, however, has consistently refused to attach criminal
responsibility to the acts of child soldiers. At the Special Court for
Sierra Leone, the Office of the Prosecutor was provided with the
jurisdiction to potentially indict persons who had been between
fifteen and eighteen years of age at the time of the commission of
their crimes.177 However, the Office of the Prosecutor “decided early
in developing a prosecutorial plan that no child between fifteen and
eighteen had the sufficiently blameworthy state of mind to commit
war crimes in a conflict setting.”178 David Crane, the former Chief
Prosecutor, wrote of the court’s June 2007 Trial Judgement against
the leadership of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council:
This marked the first time in history where commanders and political
leaders were held liable for this recently defined crime against humanity.
The Trial Chamber sent a clear message to the world that a person who
recruits child soldiers into a conflict is a war criminal, but the children
recruited and forced to commit unspeakable acts are not.179

173. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 107, 75 U.N.T.S. at 194.
174. See id. at 198.
175. See Protocol I, supra note 2, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 39.
176. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 107, 75 U.N.T.S. at 330;
Protocol I, supra note 2, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 39.
177. See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 10, ¶ 17.
178. David M. Crane, Prosecuting Children in Times of Conflict: The West
African Experience, 15 HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Spring/Summer 2008, at 15.
179. See id. at 13.
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Reflecting this approach, the International Criminal Court (ICC)
does not have jurisdiction over child soldiers. Pursuant to article 26
of the Rome Statute, which created the ICC, the court has no
jurisdiction over persons who were younger than eighteen years old
at the time of the commission of the alleged crime.180 ICC
jurisprudence has drawn a line, however, regarding the immunity of
child soldiers. Being a child soldier at one point does not shield a
person from prosecution for crimes committed once they are older
than eighteen.181 In the case of Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen,182
the defense argued that because Ongwen had been forcibly recruited
as a child soldier he should be immune from prosecution for crimes
committed as an adult.183 The Pre–Trial Chamber, in the March 2016
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, strongly rejected this
argument as being without legal basis.184
David Crane envisaged a situation where the criminal
responsibility of child soldiers in future conflicts might be raised. He
observed that,
[j]ust as we could not hold these Sierra Leonean children responsible for
the horrific violence they were forced to carry out, we also cannot hold
similar children involved in other conflicts accountable for their acts, no
matter our level of interest in the region or that our forces were the targets
of the violence.”185

Fanny Leveau also points to the significance of taking into account
relevant neuro scientific research when considering whether child
combatants have the necessary mens rea to commit crimes, asserting
that “studies demonstrate that, up to a certain age, a child is not fully
able to understand his or her acts, nor the consequences attached to

180. Rome Statute, supra note 20, at 106.
181. Darija Marković, Child Soldiers: Victims or War Criminals? 12-13 (Dec.
14, 2015) (unpublished student paper) (on file with Regional Academy on the
United Nations), http://www.ra-un.org/uploads/4/7/5/4/47544571/child_soldiers__victims_or_war_criminals.pdf.
182. Prosecutor v. Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/15-422-Red, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges Against Dominic Ongwen, ¶¶ 150-51 (Mar. 23, 2016).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See Crane, supra note 178, at 15.
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it. . . .”186
The ICL approach tacitly acknowledges that, rather than
prosecuting child soldiers, efforts should be put into Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reintegration efforts to enable former child
soldiers to rejoin civilian society. David Crane notes that, in regards
to the Special Court for Sierra Leone’s Office of the Prosecutor’s
decision not to prosecute former child soldiers, prosecutors were
“aware of the clear legal standard highlighted in international
humanitarian law” and that “the intent in choosing not to prosecute
was to rehabilitate and reintegrate this lost generation back into
society.”187 Reintegrating former child soldiers is a complex process
that necessitates addressing the psychological harm former child
soldiers have endured, providing education and skills training, and
conducting mediation with communities or families that may be
reluctant to welcome home former child soldiers.188 For ISIS’ child
soldiers, the inclusion of de-radicalization programs will also be
imperative.189

IX. CONCLUSION
Member states of the Coalition to Counter ISIS should be cautious
in both their airstrike and ground operations in regards to targeting
ISIS’ child combatants. Whilst it may superficially seem to be
permissible under IHL to afford child combatants only the same
protections as are afforded to adult combatants, the ICC’s Pre-Trial
Chamber in Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda opened the doors for an
interpretation of IHL that potentially disrupts this paradigm.
186. Fanny Leveau, Liability of Child Soldiers Under International Criminal
Law, 4 OSGOODE HALL REV. L. & POL’Y 36, 38 (2013).
187. See Crane, supra note 178, at 15.
188. John Williamson, The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of
child soldiers: social and psychological transformation in Sierra Leone, 4
INTERVENTION 185, 189-90 (2006); Mark Iacono, The Child Soldiers of Sierra
Leone: Are they Accountable for their Actions in War?, 25 SUFFOLK
TRANSACTIONAL L. REV. 445, 449-50 (2003) (“The people of Sierra Leone
disagree on how to treat these child soldiers because their memories of recent
brutality create a strong desire for justice and accountability, regardless of the
soldiers’ young age.”).
189. NOMAN BENOTMAN & NIKITA MALIK, THE CHILDREN OF ISLAMIC STATE
66 (2016).
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According to the Decision on the Confirmation of Charges in
Ntaganda, child soldiers only lose the special protections civilian
children ordinarily receive under IHL in the situation where they are
actively or directly engaged in the hostilities. Additionally, in
situations where child soldiers are subject to powers of control and
ownership, such as those potentially exercised by ISIS’ violent
commanders and recruiters, child soldiers retain their protections as
child civilians under IHL. Noting this development in IHL
jurisprudence, coalition members would be wise to evaluate the
available intelligence regarding the activities of child soldiers at
potential target locations, and the extent to which these child soldiers
may be actively engaged in hostilities, prior to launching military
attacks that would put these child soldiers at risk. In this way,
coalition forces would be acting in a manner that is both consistent
with IHL and conscious of the requirements of IHRL.
In the future post-conflict transitional justice mechanisms of Iraq
and Syria, the criminal responsibility of former child soldiers will
inevitably be addressed; however, it is important that this occurs
within the context of an underlying acknowledgement of ISIS’ child
soldiers being, first and foremost, victims of a serious international
crime themselves. At a minimum, these measures should be
performed in a manner consistent with both IHRL, by not attaching
criminal responsibility to the acts of persons who were under IHRL’s
recommended age of fourteen at the time of their commission, and
IHL, by respecting IHL protections on conditions of detention.
Transitional justice mechanisms may also strengthen their mandate
by adhering to the approaches of the ICC and the Special Court of
Sierra Leone. For instance, jurisdiction over crimes committed by
persons younger than eighteen years at the time of commission may
be precluded, and criminal responsibility may be assertively attached
to ISIS’ child soldiers’ recruiters and commanders, and not to child
soldiers themselves. Following the lead of the Special Court for
Sierra Leone, efforts should instead go into disarmament,
demobilization, de-radicalization and reintegration programs to
combat the complex process of equipping former child soldiers to
rejoin and fully participate in civilian life.

